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LABOR LAW-THE ST. FRANCIS II DISPARITY OF INTERESTS 
TEST-Is IT NECESSARY? 
INTRODUCTION 
Health care is a unique commodity. There exists a strong public 
interest in the uninterrupted provision of quality care. The role of the 
government in the area of labor relations in the health care industry is 
to protect the interests of health care consumers while safeguarding 
the right of employees to engage in concerted activity for their mutual 
aid and protection. 1 
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is the agency 
charged with overseeing the establishment and conduct of the collec­
tive bargaining process in the private sector.2 One task assigned to the 
Board by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is the determina­
tion of appropriate bargaining units within a given industry and enter­
prise.3 Ever since the enactment of the 1974 health care amendments 
to the National Labor Relations Act,4 the Board has applied the com­
munity of interest standard to determine appropriate bargaining units 
in the health care industry. In 1984, in St. Francis Hospital & IBEW5 
[hereinafter St. Francis II], the Board reconsidered its earlier decision 
1. In 1974, Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act to extend its cover­
age to hospital employees in the "not-for-profit" sector of the industry. National Labor 
Relations Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974). 
2. 29 U.S.c. § 153(b) (1982). 
3. "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure employees the 
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the 
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdi­
vision thereof. ..." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982). This determination of an appropriate unit is 
important for several reasons. The size and occupational make-up of the bargaining unit 
will greatly affect the outcome of the representation election. See Chaison, A nother View of 
Union Organizing and the Small Employer, 19 MARQ. Bus. REV. 143 (1975); Rose, What 
Factors Influence Union Representation Elections?, cited in Chaison, Unit Size and Union 
Success in Representation Elections, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 1973, at 51-52 (1973). 
Also, the unit chosen by the Board will circumscribe the bargaining goals (and bargaining 
strength) of the parties. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 67 (2d ed. 1982). 
In determining an appropriate bargaining unit, the Board tries to promote industrial peace 
through a stable collective bargaining relationship while at the same time affording employ­
ees freedom of choice. Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134,49 L.R.R.M. 1715 
(1962). 
4. Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974). 
5. 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 116 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1984). 
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in St. Francis Hospital & JBEW6, [hereinafter St. Francis J] and 
adopted a new standard for determining appropriate units in the 
health care industry.7 To be certified as a separate unit, petitioning 
employees must, under St. Francis II, demonstrate that a disparity of 
interests exists between themselves and other non-management em­
ployees, rather than showing that the employees in the requested unit 
share a community of interest.8 
This note argues that applying the disparity of interests test will 
not result in an appropriate balance between the right of professional 
health care employees9 to organize under the Act and the public's 
need for uninterrupted quality health care. The result of the new test 
may be a sUbjugation of the professional employee's right to organize 
rather than a balance. This result is at odds with the Act's goal of 
encouraging collective bargaining. lO 
Part One briefly examines the controversy between some courts of 
appeals and the Board over the correct interpretation of the Congres­
sional admonition against undue proliferation of bargaining units in 
the health care industry. I I This conflict led to the NLRB's adoption 
of the disparity of interests test. Part Two points out that this test 
ignores empirical research which indicates that an expansion of unit 
size among professional health care employees will hamper substan­
tially their ability to organize and, more importantly, will eliminate 
much of the incentive for professional health care employees to engage 
in collective bargaining. It further contends that the predictable re­
sults of the test will so discourage organizing among professional em­
6. 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153 (1982). 
7. St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470. 
8. Id. 
9. This note discusses only the rights of professionals employed in hospitals and 
health care institutions. 
10. Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to 
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, 
or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recog­
nized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamen­
tal to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to 
wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargain­
ing power between employers and employees. . .. It is declared to be the policy of 
the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the 
free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they 
have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining 
and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self­
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the 
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other 
mutual aid or protection. 
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). 
11. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. 
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ployees as to effectively deny them the right of self-organization and 
collective bargaining. 
Finally, Part Three notes that in light of the safeguards already 
present in the law, the Board's extension of the additional "protec­
tion" of requiring larger professional employee units in the health care 
industry is unwarranted and contrary to the "twin goals" of the 1974 
amendments. 12 
I BACKGROUND 
A. The 1974 Health Care Amendments 
The enactment of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act 
gave all health care employees the right to engage in collective bar­
gaining with their employers.'3 In 1947, the Labor-Management Re­
lations (Taft-Hartley) Act excluded non-profit hospital employees 
from the coverage of the NLRA.14 The 1974 health care amendments 
12. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WEL­
FARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COVERAGE OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS UNDER THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1974, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 256-57 (1974) [hereinafter 
HISTORY OF THE COVERAGE OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS]. See also 120 CONGo REC. 
13,560 (1974). 
13. In re Central Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., 44 N.L.R.B. 533 (1942), 145 F.2d 
852 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945) (NLRA applies to non-profit, chari­
table hospitals); National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449-57 (1936). 
Although eligible for union membership, health care employees did not participate in the 
mass organizing drives of the 1930's. Becker & Miller, Patterns and Determinants 0/ Union 
Growth in the Hospital Industry, 2 J. LAB. RES. 309, 312 (1981). See generally R. MILLER, 
HOSPITALS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN EXPERIENCES (G. 
G. Somers ed. 1980); R. MILLER, B. BECKER & E. KRINSKI, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING ON HOSPITALS (1979). 
14. The LMRA removed non-profit hospitals from the definition of "employer," 29 
U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982), by adding language excluding "any corporation or association op­
erating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private share­
holder or individual." Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 
Stat. 136 (1947). Responding to the pre-Wagner Act tactic of the recognition strike, some 
states passed legislation (or their state labor board asserted jurisdiction over non-profit 
health care employees) allowing employees in non-profit health care institutions to organ­
ize. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 150A, § 9A (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.35-179.39 
(West 1947). See also J. ABODEELY, R. HAMMER & A. SANDLER, THE NLRB AND THE 
ApPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT (1981); L. TANNER, H. WEINSTEIN & A. AHMUTY, 
IMPACT OF THE 1974 HEALTH CARE AMENDMENTS TO THE NLRA ON COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 33 (1979). 
In explaining the need for the amendments, the Senate committee report stated: "The 
Committee was also impressed with the fact, emphasized by many witnesses, that the ex­
emption of non-profit hospitals from the Act has resulted in numerous instances of recogni­
tion strikes and picketing." S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3946, 3948. See also Delaney, Union Success in Hospital 
Election, 20 INDUS. REL. 149, 150 (1981). 
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to the NLRA removed the exclusionary language of the Taft-Hartley 
Act.lS Lawmakers determined that it no longer made sense to leave 
workers employed in this expanding sector of the economy outside the 
protection of the Act. 16 These amendments advanced two basic pur­
poses which have become known as the "twin goals" of the amend­
ments: (1) to extend the right to organize and the right to bargain 
collectively to non-profit sector health care employees; and (2) to as­
sure a continued supply of quality health care to patients and 
communities. 17 
Congress recognized that there is a strong public interest in the 
provision of health care services uninterrupted by labor disputes. 
While strikes and work stoppages in most private sector industries 
have an adverse effect on commerce, this effect is seldom immediate or 
life-threatening. Disruptions in the flow of health care services could 
have immediate and serious consequences to individual patients as 
well as to entire communities. 
Congress took steps to safeguard public access to uninterrupted, 
quality health care. It admonished the National Labor Relations 
Board to refrain from promoting the proliferation of bargaining units 
in the health care industry. IS Along with extending to health care em­
ployees the right to organize and bargain collectively, Congress modi­
fied various sections of the National Labor Relations Act to restrict 
the exercise of these rights. 19 As a result, health care employees exer­
cise their collective bargaining rights and their rights to negotiate, 
picket, and collectively withhold their labor in a very different statu­
tory environment from other unionized private sector employees.2o 
At the same time, however, Congress referred to the extension of 
15. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982) (deleting exclusionary language), and 29 U.S.C. 
§ 152(14) (1982) (adding definition of health care institution). 
16. In discussing the purpose of the amendments, the Senate committee stated: 
The Committee could find no acceptable reason why 1,427,012 employees in 
these non-profit, non-public hospitals representing 56% of all hospital employees, 
should continue to be excluded from the coverage and protections of the Act. In 
the Committee's deliberations on this measure, it was recognized that the needs of 
patients in health care institutions required special consideration in the Act ...." 
S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 3946, 3948. 
17. HISTORY OF THE COVERAGE OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS, supra note 12, at 256­
57; see also 120 CONGo REC. 13,560 (1974). 
18. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 108-21 and accompanying text. 
20. Major differences include: 29 U.S.c. § 158(d)(A) (1982) (lengthening the re­
quired notice of contract expiration or termination period from 60 days to 90 days for 
health care employees, including a lengthening of notice to the FMCS from 30 days to 60 
days); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(B) (1982) (30 day notice to FMCS of a dispute on initial con­
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collective bargaining rights to non-profit sector health care employees 
as a "twin goal" of the 1974 amendments. 21 Congress intended that 
these employees should have the right to choose whether they will use 
the vehicle of collective bargaining to resolve their problems on the 
job. Certainly, it is in the public interest that the government should 
actively discourage health care employees from using "self-help" 
methods such as recognition strikes.22 
Thus, the 1974 amendments set for the NLRB the delicate task of 
balancing two co-equal social goals: fostering collective bargaining in 
the non-profit health care industry while protecting public access to 
uninterrupted, quality health care.23 The application of the 1974 
amendments, and the congressional admonition, are at the heart of the 
controversy over appropriate bargaining units in the health care 
industry. 
B. 	 The Congressional Admonition Against Proliferation of 
Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry 
The large number of professions, crafts, and job classifications 
present in the organization of the modern hospital creates the poten­
tial for many separate bargaining units.24 Despite the congressional 
admonition against it, bargaining unit proliferation may not, in itself, 
be inherently wrong.25 Rather, allowing the various professions, 
crafts, and job classifications within a hospital each to obtain separate 
tracts unique to health care); 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1982) (10 day notice requirement to insti­
tutions by health care employees before engaging in any picketing). 
21. 	 See 120 CONGo REC. 13,560 (remarks by Sen. Humphrey). 
22. "Coverage under the Act should completely eliminate the need for any such 
activity, since the procedures of the Act will be available to resolve organizational and 
recognitional disputes." S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3946, 3948. 
23. 	 See supra note 17. 
24. What follows is a brief overview of the legislative history of the congressional 
admonition against proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry and the 
controversy between the Board and the courts of appeals regarding its interpretation. For 
further analysis of the legislative history and the controversy itself, see Bumpass, Appropri­
ate Bargaining Units in Health Care Institutions: An Analysis o/Congressionallntent and 
its Implementation by The National Labor Relations Board, 20 B.C.L. REV. 867 (1979); 
Feheley, Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act; Health Care Institutions, 36 
OHIO ST. L.J. 235 (1975); Vernon, Labor Relations in the Health Care Field Under the 
1974 Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: An Overview and Analysis, 70 Nw. 
U.L. 	REV. 202 (1975). 
25. However, multiple units invariably will increase administrative costs. Personnel 
departments will be called upon to negotiate with a number of bargaining agents and ad­
minister different contracts. Also, a multiple unit structure may give rise to "whipsawing" 
and "leapfrogging" tactics by the competing unions and thus raise labor costs. 
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representation may assure employees "the fullest freedom in exercising 
the rights guaranteed by this [Act],"26 The Board would simply apply 
the community of interests test to determine the appropriateness of the 
unit petitioned for and decide the issue as it does in any other 
industry.27 
There are strong indications that this approach would result in a 
multitude of separate bargaining units in an average modem hospi­
tal.28 Modem American hospitals are highly developed bureaucra­
cies.29 The Board would apply its traditional "craft" criteria to an 
industry where specialization and departmentalization are the rule. 
Various medical support personnel, such as laboratory technologists, 
physical therapists and psychiatric social workers, are likely to have 
26. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (Supp. I 1983). See supra note 3. 
27. In evaluating a petition to determine the appropriateness of the unit requested, 
the Board looks at such factors as: (1) similarity in the scale and manner of determining 
earnings; (2) similarity in employment benefits, hours of work and other terms and condi­
tions of employment; (3) similarity in the kind of work performed; (4) similarity in training, 
qualifications, and skill of the employees; (5) frequency of contact or interchange among 
employees; (6) geographic proximity; (7) continuity or integration of production process; 
(8) common supervision and determination oflabor-relations policy; (9) relationship to the 
administrative organization of the employer; (to) history of collective bargaining; 
(11) desires of affected employees; (12) extent of union organization. See A. Cox, D. BOK 
& R. GORMAN, CASES & MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 300 (8th ed. 1977); R. GORMAN, 
supra note 3. The Board enunciated the community of interest test in Continental Baking 
Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 998 (1942). 
The Act gives little guidance to the Board for determining an appropriate unit. 29 
U.S.C. § 159(b), sets out the general policy of unit determinations. The Act places restric­
tions on the Board's discretion. 29 U.S.c. § 159(b)(1) (unit including both professional and 
non-professional employees inappropriate unless professionals vote for inclusion, Leedom 
v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Sonotone Corp., 90 N.L.R.B. 1236, 26 L.R.R.M. 1354 
(1950»; 29 U.S.C. § 1 59(b)(2) (forbids Board to find craft unit inappropriate solely because 
of Board precedent finding industrial unit, unless craft employees opt for inclusion, Globe 
Mach. & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294, 21 L.R.R.M. 337 (1937»; 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) 
(exclusion of guards); 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (extent of employee organization not control­
ling). 
Consent elections do not produce opinions by regional boards regarding the appropri­
ateness of the unit, but directed elections do. The hospital industry has tended to oppose 
unionization vigorously. Cain, Becker, McGaughlin & Schwenk, The Effect of Unions on 
Wages in Hospitals, 4 RES. LAB. EcON. 191, 194 (1984). Thus, consent elections are rare. 
Voluntary recognition is "nonexistent" in the hospital industry; Becker & Miller, supra 
note 13, at 313. Thus, a fair number of written decisions on bargaining unit determinations 
in health care institutions exist. 
28. "Potential craft and departmental units abound in health care institutions. There 
are more than 238 separate job classifications in use in health care institutions and these 
classifications are commonly grouped into large numbers of separate departments." 
Bumpass, supra note 24, at 880 n.72 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, JOB DESCRIPTIONS AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS FOR HOSPITALS AND RELATED HEALTH SERVICES 2, 15 
(rev. ed. 1971». 
29. S. GOLDSMITH, MODERN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT 141-42 (1984). 
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different degrees and educational backgrounds; to be licensed or certi­
fied by different bodies; and have separate professional organizations. 
Craftspeople can range from carpenters, electricians, and plumbers to 
audio-visual technicians and CAT scanner repairers. 3o Even apart 
from direct patient care departments, there are medical records de­
partments, food service, laundry, and grounds crews; anyone of these 
departments might be eligible for separate representation.31 
This type of fragmentation of the workforce into multiple sepa­
rate bargaining units was of major concern to the legislators consider­
ing the 1974 amendments.32 Reference was made to the construction 
industry during the debate on the amendments.33 In that industry, 
various groups of tradespeople such as carpenters, masons, and electri­
cians routinely are found to constitute separate bargaining units enti­
tled to separate representation. A contractor might have agreements 
with a dozen different unions, each having different wage rates, work 
rules, and grievance procedures. A strike, for whatever reason, by one 
of these unions might idle many other tradespeople and perhaps halt 
construction completely. While the costs and delays resulting from 
such strikes may be inconvenient but perhaps tolerable in the con­
struction industry, similar interruptions of the flow of medical services 
30. It is possible that many of these groups could qualify for separate representation 
under the Mallinckrodt standard. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387, 64 
L.R.R.M. 1011 (1966). Under the Mallinckrodt standard craft units are established where 
there can be found a "distinct and homogeneous group of skilled journeymen craftsmen 
performing the functions of their craft on a nonrepetitive basis." Id. at 397, 64 L.R.R.M. at 
1016. 
31. Id. The Board's recent decision in North Arundel Hosp. & Md. Nurses Ass'n, 
279 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 11 17,804 (Apr. 16, 1986), illustrates the diversity and depart­
mentalization of the ranks of professional employees in modem hospitals. There the Re­
gional Director granted a separate bargaining unit to registered nurses, citing as support for 
his decision the distinct job responsibilities of RNs and their organization into a separate 
department. The Board noted that: "Carried to its logical extreme, the Regional Director's 
rationale could result in separate bargaining units for professionals in the pharmacy, physi­
cal therapy, radiology/CT/nuclear medicine, laboratory/pathology, patient services, re­
spiratory/pulmonary, and social work departments ...." Id. 
32. The issue of proliferation of bargaining units in health care institutions 
has also greatly concerned me during consideration of legislation in this area. 
Hospitals and other types of health care institutions are particularly vulnerable to 
a mUltiplicity of bargaining units due to the diversified nature of the medical serv­
ices provided patients. If each professional interest and job classification is per­
mitted to form a separate bargaining unit, numerous administrative and labor 
relations problems become involved in the delivery of health care. 
120 CONGo REc. 12,944 (1974) (statement of Sen. Taft). 
33. On the issue of unit proliferation, Senator Taft remarked: "The administrative 
problems from a practical operation viewpoint and labor relations viewpoint must be con­
sidered by the Board on this issue. Health-care institutions must not be permitted to go the 
route of other industries, particularly the construction trades, in this regard." Id. at 12,945 
(statement of Sen. Taft). 
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could endanger individual patients as well as the health of entire com­
munities that rely on a strike-bound hospital. 
The Senate committee directed the Board to avoid unit prolifera­
tion in the health care industry, using the words: 
Due consideration should be given by the Board to preventing 
proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry. In this 
connection, the Committee notes with approval the recent Board 
decisions in Four Seasons Nursing Center, 208 NLRB No. 50, 85 
LRRM 1093 (1974), and Woodland Park Hospital, 205 NLRB No. 
144, 84 LRRM 1075 (1973), as well as the trend toward broader 
units enunciated in Extendicare of West Virginia, 204 NLRB No. 
170, 83 LRRM 1242 (1973).3 
3·By our reference to Extendicare, we do not necessarily approve all of the hold­
ings of that decision.34 
However, Congress rejected amendments which would have mandated 
by statute a prescribed number of units.35 Congress did not intend to 
preclude the Board from relying on its own expertise in determining 
appropriate units in the health care industry.36 The 1974 amendments 
do not contain any specific reference to bargaining unit structure; nor 
do the amendments direct the Board to adopt a particular method of 
approach in determining an appropriate unit in the health care 
industry. 
34. Id. at 12,944 (statement of Sen. Taft) (quoting S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3946,3950; H.R. REP. No. 
1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1974». 
35. S.2292, introduced by Senator Taft, would have placed a four unit cap on the 
number of appropriate units in the health care industry. This language was deleted from 
the final bill. 120 CONGo REC. 13,561 (1974). 
36. Of the language quoted supra at note 33, Senator Taft said: "I believe this is a 
sound approach and a constructive compromise, as the Board should be permitted some 
flexibility in unit determination cases." 120 CONGo REC. 12,944 (1974) (statement of Sen. 
Taft). 
Senator Williams stated: 
The National Labor Relations Board has shown good judgment in establish­
ing appropriate units for the purposes of collective bargaining, particularly in 
wrestling with units in newly covered industries. While the Board has, as a rule, 
tended to avoid unnecessary proliferation of collective bargaining units among 
nonsupervisory employees, particularly when there is such a history in the area or 
a notable disparity of interests between employees in different job classifications. 
While the committee clearly intends that the Board give due consideration to 
its admonition to avoid an undue proliferation of units in the health care industry, 
it did not within this framework intend to preclude the Board acting in the public 
interest from exercising its specialized experience and expert knowledge in deter­
mining appropriate bargaining units. 
120 CONGo REC. 22,949 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams). 
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Unit determinations based on substantial evidence are "rarely to 
be disturbed."37 However, several courts of appeals have been willing 
to overturn unit determinations in the health care industry.38 The rea­
son commonly cited for this lack of deference to the agency's expertise 
is that the Board has not followed properly the Congressional admoni­
tion and instead has allowed proliferation of units within hospitals and 
other health care institutions.39 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found in the legislative his­
tory of the 1974 amendments a mandate for the adoption of a disparity 
of interests test.40 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished 
this test from the Board's community of interest approach, which the 
court characterized as starting with a narrow unit and adding employ­
ees with shared interests.41 An approach which comports with the 
congressional admonition, the court contended, would begin with the 
broadest unit possible and would narrow it by excluding employees 
with interests disparate from this group.42 In Allegheny General Hos­
pital v. NLRB 43 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals expressed its im­
37. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (l946). 
38. "Overturn" is perhaps imprecise here. The reviewing court actually denies en­
forcement of a Board bargaining order based on what it considers to be an inappropriate 
unit determination, in effect overturning the Board's decision. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fredrick 
Memorial Hosp., 691 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1982); Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. 
NLRB, 653 F.2d 450 (lOth Cir. 1981); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d 
Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n., 606 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1979); NLRB v. St. Francis 
Hosp. of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 
F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978). 
39. See, e.g., Mary Thompson Hasp., 621 F.2d at 861; Mercy Hasp. Ass'n., 606 F.2d 
at 28; West Suburban Hasp., 570 F.2d at 216. 
40. St. Francis Hosp. ofLynwood, 601 F.2d at 419. The court found that the legisla­
tive history of the 1974 amendments: 
[R]equir[ed] the Board to determine not the similarities among employees in the 
same job classification (indeed the fact that they share the same classification 
would inevitably lead to the discovery of many similarities), but instead the "dis­
parity of interests" among employee classifications which prevent a combination 
of groups of employees into a single broader unit thereby minimizing unit 
proliferation. 
Id. 
41. Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center, 653 F.2d at 457-58. 
42. Id. The St. Francis II majority specifically declined to adopt the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals' "rigid" disparity of interests test, and agreed with the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals' analysis in Watonwan Memorial Hosp. v. N.L.R.B., 711 F.2d 848, 850 
(1983), that such a test would "always require the Board to select the largest appropriate 
bargaining unit." St. Francis 11,271 N.L.R.B. at 950, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470. The majority 
rejected this "per se" approach for a more "flexible" disparity of interests test along the 
lines advocated by the Ninth Circuit. 
43. 608 F.2d 965 (3rd Cir. 1979). 
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patience with the Board's adherence to the community of interest 
standard: 
This petition for review of an order of the [Board] requires us to 
review the actions of an agency that declines to follow our prece­
dent while conceding applicability of that precedent. We hold that 
the NLRB must respect the applicable decisions of this court, and 
therefore we grant the [Hospital's] petition for review and deny the 
Board's cross-petition for enforcement.44 
Not all the circuit courts of appeals have agreed with the Ninth 
Circuit's reading of the legislative history of the 1974 amendments. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found no legislative 
history to support a disparity of interests test45 and the Second Circuit 
disregarded the test proposed by other courts of appeals, stating that it 
was balancing the "employees' rights to exercise section 7 rights with 
the congressional admonition against unit proliferation."46 The D.C. 
Circuit has recently held that: "The 1974 Amendments in no way 
require the Board to apply a disparity-of-interest standard when deter­
mining appropriate bargaining units in nonprofit health-care institu­
tions."47 Both views of the legislative history enjoy support from 
commentators.48 Attorney Michael Stapp has argued that the dispute 
44. Id. at 966, quoted in Curley, Health Care Unit Determinations: The Board Ig­
nores the Mandate of Congress and the Courts ofAppeals, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 103, 112 
(1984). See also Husband, Determining Appropriate Units in Health Care Institutions-The 
Gap Widens, 32 LAB. L.J. 780 (1981). 
45. NLRB v. Walker County Medical Center, 722 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1984). 
46. Trustees of Masonic Hall & Asylum Fund v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 626, 633 (2d Cir. 
1983). 
47. IBEW v. NLRB, No. 85-1642 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 1987) [hereinafter St. Francis 
III). On August 28, 1984, shortly after suffering reversal in St. Francis II, the IBEW re­
quested the Board to withdraw its remand of the case and enter a final order disposing of 
the unfair labor practice charge. On June 26, 1985 the Board dismissed the complaint in 
the unfair labor practice proceedings and cleared the way for an appeal. In St. Francis III, 
Judge Edwards stated that the Board in St. Francis II had considered the disparity of 
interest test mandated by the 1974 Amendments. The D.C. Circuit unanimously disagreed, 
however, finding that "in adopting the disparity-of-interests standard, the Board ignored 
fundamental principles of statutory interpretation.' Id. at 27. Because the Board's decision 
was based on an erroneous view of the law, the court, mindful of SEC v. Chenery, re­
manded without expressing an opinion on the proper outcome of the case. Id. at 4-5. The 
court did not rule on whether or not the Board could adopt the disparity of interest stan­
dard as a matter of policy under the discretionary power granted it by section 9 of the Act. 
48. See, e.g., Curley, supra note 44; Dyleski-Najjar, Professional Unions in the Health 
Care Industry: The Impact ofSt. Francis II and North Shore University Hospital, 17 LoY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 383 (1986) (urging the disparity of interests test); Note, The Nonproliferation 
Mandate and the Appropriate Legal Standard in Health Care Bargaining Unit Determina­
tions, 11 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 663 (1983). But see Stapp, Ten Years After: A Legal 
Framework of Collective Bargaining in the Hospital Industry, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 63 
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between the Board and some of the appeals courts was a result of 
"philosophical differences regarding the relative status of the commu­
nity of interest test and the unit proliferation issue. "49 The Board had 
felt it necessary to strike a balance between the employees' right to a 
bargaining unit based on this test and the congressional admonition. so 
Attorney Michael Curley has contended that the disparity of interests 
test will result in fewer units in health care institutionss1 and thus 
comports with the congressional intent that a more restrictive ap­
proach be taken toward health care unit determinations. 52 Accord­
ingly, Curley has characterized the Board's approach prior to St. 
Francis II as "flawed. "53 
The Board ultimately adopted a disparity of interests test in St. 
Francis II.54 The next section examines this test more closely and dis­
cusses its suitability for resolving conflict in the health care industry. 
C. The Board Adopts the Disparity of Interests Test 
1. St. Francis I 
On September 28, 1979, the International Brotherhood of Electri­
cal Workers (IBEW) Local 474 filed a petition with the NLRB to hold 
a representation election for a group of skilled maintenance employees 
at St. Francis Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee. On November 19, 
1979, the employer requested review of the Regional Director's unit 
determination decision. On December 4, 1979, the National Labor 
Relations Board granted the employer's request for review. The 
Board rendered its decision upholding the Regional Director's deci­
sion on December 16, 1982 (St. Francis 1).55 
(1984); contra Comment, Bargaining Unit Determinations in the Health Care Industry­
The Gospel According to St. Francis II, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 67 (1985) 
49. Stapp, supra note 48, at 76. 
50. Id. 
51. Curley, supra note 44, at 121. 
52. Id. at 122. 
53. Id. at 121. 
54. St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 954, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471. See infra note 68-71 
and accompanying text. 
55. On November 5, 1979, the Regional Director (Region 26) found an appropriate 
unit of maintenance employees including more job classifications than the unit requested by 
the union, but far fewer than the employer's request for a unit of all service and mainte­
nance employees at the hospital. The employer filed a request for review of the Regional 
Director's decision and the National Labor Relations Board granted that request on De­
cember 4,1979. At the close of balloting of the subsequent directed election (December 7, 
1979), the Board impounded the ballot box. 
Two years later, on December 16, 1982, the NLRB issued its decision (St. Francis 1) 
on the employer's request for review of the Regional Director's unit determination deci­
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St. Francis 1 56 explicated the "two-step" analysis used to resolve 
unit determinations in health care institutions. First, the Board estab­
lishes seven "potentially" (but not presumptively) appropriate units. 57 
If the unit requested by the petitioning employees does not match the 
definition of one of these units, it is "presumptively" inappropriate and 
the petition is dismissed. This caps the number of appropriate units for 
health care institutions. 58 If the unit petitioned for survives this step, 
the Board's second step is to consider arguments based on the specific 
characteristics of the particular institution to determine whether the 
petitioning employees share a sufficient community of interest to be 
granted a separate bargaining unit. 59 The Board does not impose auto­
matically the seven unit scheme on a particular health care institution. 
If the organizational make-up of a particular enterprise is such that 
splitting the employees into one or more of these units would be artifi­
cial or inappropriate, a separate unit would not be granted. Thus, an 
enterprise should have no more than seven appropriate units and, de­
sion and direction of election. The Board agreed with the Regional Director's decision 
finding the unit in which the election was held to be appropriate for bargaining. The Board 
opened the impounded ba\1ot box on January 5, 1983, and certified IBEW Local 474 as the 
exclusive co\1ective bargaining agent for the employees in the unit. 
On January 17, 1983, in response to a request by the union to open negotiations, the 
employer, in writing, refused to recognize or bargain with the union. On January 21, the 
union filed 8(a)(I) and 8(a)(5) (failure to bargain) charges against the employer. The em­
ployer defended the ensuing summary judgment motion by maintaining that the unit as 
found by the Regional Director and approved on review by the fu\1 Board was inappropri­
ate. Although parties are not a\1owed to raise as a defense and re-litigate issues which were 
litigated in a prior representation hearing, the Board, sua sponte, decided to reconsider its 
decision in St. Francis I. 
56. St. Francis I, 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153. 
57. Id. at 1031, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1160. 

We begin with a maximum of seven potentially appropriate units, derived through 

our 8 years' experience with the industry: physicians, registered nurses, other pro­

fessionals, technical employees, business office clerical employees, service and 

maintenance employees, and maintenance employees. These units are neither pre­

sumptively appropriate nor will they invariably be granted. They are, rather, 
commonly found employee groups which may warrant their own bargaining units 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
58. One commentator contends that the majority's "cap" is ineffective. 
Yet, under the fo\1owing circumstances, this figure could be inflated beyond seven 
units: (I) a separate guard unit pursuant to statutory requirement; (2) where a 
prior bargaining relationship existed with an employee group which does not con­
form to one of the seven basic units; (3) a stipulation of the parties; (4) unit ap­
proval due to comity; or (5) some other "extraordinary circumstance." 
Note, supra note 47, at 681-82 (footnotes omitted). The St. Francis I majority claimed, 
however, that "additional unit" cases would be rare, St. Francis I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1032, 
112 L.R.R.M. at 1160. 
59. St. Francis I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1029, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1158. 
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pending on local factors, might have fewer. In this way, the Board 
applies the congressional admonition by factoring it into the first step 
of the analysis. 
The majority said that St. Francis I explained the approach the 
Board had used implicitly since 1974 in determining appropriate bar­
gaining units in the health care industry.60 The courts of appeals may 
have misunderstood the Board's processes if they have assumed the 
Board has applied only the community of interests test, without more, 
to the health care industry.61 The Board has not merely genuflected to 
the congressional admonition against undue proliferation of bargain­
ing units. The majority believed that its approach implemented the 
congressional admonition and struck the appropriate balance between 
proliferation of units and the employees' right to organize. 62 
2. St. Francis II 
But ifSt. Francis I was in some way the "culmination" of this line 
of analysis, it was also its demise. Indeed, the Board never utilized St. 
Francis 1.63 Despite a sizable backlog of cases64 the Board did not 
issue a decision in a unit determination case in the health care industry 
for a year and a half.65 Instead, the Board, on its own initiative, recon­
sidered St. Francis I, overruling it in August of 1984.66 
The majority in St. Francis II acknowledged that the Board's in­
terpretation of the Congressional admonition against proliferation of 
bargaining units in health care institutions was at odds with the deci­
sions of several of the courts of appeals.67 The Board turned from the 
traditional community of interests standard and adopted a unique dis­
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 1031, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1160. 
62. Id. at 1029-30, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1158-60. 
63. "My colleagues in the majority have successfully prevented that case and any 
case relying on it from seeing the light of day. As of today, the St. Francis I standard has 
never received a full review in any court of appeals." St. Francis Hosp. & IBEW, 271 
N.L.R.B. 948, 955, 116 L.R.R.M. 1465, 1472 (1984) (Member Zimmerman dissenting) 
(footnote omitted). 
64. Member Zimmerman noted in January of 1981, almost two years prior to the 
decision in St. Francis I, that the Board was "fully aware of the large number of cases 
awaiting decision on this issue" (health care unit determinations), and promised that the 
Board would "endeavor to reach it with something greater than all deliberate speed." Zim­
merman, Trends in NLRB Health Care Industry Decisions, 32 LAB. L.J. 3, 7 (1981). 
65. By the time St. Francis II issued, the Board had a backlog of some 80 cases; the 
largest single category of backlogged cases. St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 955 n.3, 116 
L.R.R.M. at 1472 n.3 (Member Zimmerman dissenting). 
66. See supra note 55. 
67. St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 952, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1469. 
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parity of interests standard for health care unit determinations.68 
Under the disparity of interests test, the Board subjected the unit peti­
tioned for by the employees to heightened scrutiny,69 requiring a find­
ing of sharper than usual differences between the petitioning 
employees and the non-petitioning employees in order for the unit to 
be appropriate.70 This is a different and more rigorous standard than 
the Board uses in any other industry.71 
II. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE DISPARITY OF INTERESTS TEST 
In St. Francis II, the majority clearly stated the logical and statu­
tory underpinnings of its position. First, "Congress concluded that 
the object of minimizing work stoppages resulting from initial organi­
zational activities, jurisdictional disputes, and sympathy strikes could 
best be achieved, and thus the likelihood of disruptions to health care 
reduced, by minimizing the number of units appropriate in the health 
care industry."72 Second, the Board declared that applying the dispar­
ity of interests test to unit determinations in the health care industry 
"must necessarily result in fewer units and will thus reflect meaning­
ful application of the congressional injunction against unit 
fragmentation. "73 
The important social goal of providing health care services unin­
terrupted by labor disputes must be balanced against another impor­
tant goal; protecting the employees' rights to organize and bargain 
collectively. These rights are embodied in Section 1 of the Wagner 
Act74 and reiterated in the legislative history of the 1974 health care 
amendments.75 The failure to provide a mechanism for the exercise of 
these rights may bring about results which are antithetical to the ac­
companying goal of assuring uninterrupted health care services.76 
68. Id. at 954, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471. 
69. Id. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470. 
70. Id. 
That is to say, the appropriateness of the petitioned-for unit is judged in terms of 
normal criteria, but sharper than usual differences (or "disparities") between the 
wages, hOUTS, and working conditions, etc. of the requested employees and those 
in an overall professional or nonprofessional unit must be established to grant the 
unit. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
71. Id. at 951, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470. 
72. Id. at 950-51, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1468. 
73. Id. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470. 
74. See infra note 13. 
75. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3946. 
76. "The Board seems to be ignoring the fact that if employees in the hospital indus­
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Many American labor leaders have predicted that health care employ­
ees may resort to such extra-legal tactics if they are systematically 
frustrated by the Board's policyJ7 
But the disparity of interests test may result in units of such size 
and heterogeneity that employees would not, in the overwhelming ma­
jority of cases, be able to organize successfully. Even if the employees 
were able to win a representation election, the heterogeneity of the 
unit could prove an obstacle to achievement of their collective bargain­
ing goals. Such results would be antithetical to the twin goals of the 
1974 amendments. 
Non-proliferation of units is a tool for minimizing work stoppages 
and the resultant disruption in the flow of health care services. Used 
in conjunction with the other special provisions of the Act which ap­
ply to health care employees,78 this tool should bring about a proper 
balance of the "twin goals." However, the Board should not use non­
proliferation to prevent health care employees from organizing them­
selves into unions on the pretext of preventing work stoppages and 
disruptions to the delivery of health care services. In adopting the 
disparity of interests test, the Board should not achieve the proper, 
desired goal of minimizing work stoppages by the use of an improper, 
undesirable means; specifically, preventing health care employees from 
organizing. 
A. Effect of Unit Size on the Outcome ofRepresentation Elections 
The NLRB does not employ economists, industrial sociologists, 
or other like professionals to engage in empirical research and inform 
its decisionmaking process. 79 It has no yardstick against which to 
try are not afforded adequate employment rights under the law, they will exercise those 
rights regardless of the law. This is a consideration which at least implicitly underlies all 
labor legislation." Stapp, supra note 48, at 71 n.65. 
77. See Remarks by John Sweeny (Service Employees Internation Union), Henry 
Nicholas (National Union of Hospital & Health Care Employees), Robert Muehlenkamp 
(NUHHCE), and Candice Owley (Federation of Nurses & Health Professionals-Ameri­
can Federation of Teachers) testifying before the House Subcommittee on Labor-Manage­
ment Relations and on Manpower and Housing, October 3, 1984 as reported in 56 WHITE 
COLLAR REP. (BNA) No. 14, at 414 (Oct. 10, 1984). See also Address by Eileen Mc­
Manus, A Union Perspective on Health Care Bargaining Units, before the Association of 
Labor Relations Agencies Conference (July 25, 1985). 
78. See infra notes 108-22, and accompanying text. 
79. "Nothing in this subchapter shaH be construed to authorize the Board to appoint 
individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation, or for economic analysis." 29 
U.S.c. § I 54(a) (1982). This has not always been the case. For an account of the early role 
of the Economics Division of the NLRB, see J. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (1979). For an account of the Division's decline and demise 
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measure the results of the policies it adopts in the course of individual 
adjudications. It cannot present its statutory and precedential argu­
ments to the courts of appeals buttressed with data which would pre­
dict what results will flow from the adoption or rejection of particular 
policies. Neither has the Board engaged in any type of rulemaking, 
informal or formal, in its over fifty year history.80 When courts defer 
to Board decisions, they are merely yielding to the collective experi­
ence of the Board members in the area of labor relations and their 
familiarity with the NLRA and Board precedent. 
The Board's adoption in St. Francis II of the "disparity of inter­
ests" test is a fundamental break in the way it has interpreted the 
health care amendments since their enactment in 1974. Prior to St. 
Francis II, the Board relied on the community of interest test used in 
other industries, modified by the congressional admonition against 
proliferation of bargaining units in health care institutions.81 The 
logic of this approach, or at least the articulation of the premises, ap­
peared to culminate in the "two-tiered" scheme espoused by the ma­
jority in St. Francis I. Several courts of appeals recommended the 
disparity of interests test as the correct way to implement the congres­
sional admonition against proliferation of bargaining units in the 
health care industry.82 However, neither the courts nor the Board 
thoroughly considered the effect of the disparity of interests test on 
industry employees and their rights to organize.83 
One truth on which both academics and practitioners of labor 
during the McCarthy period, see J. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD (1981) [hereinafter RESHAPING THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD]. The Board does compile statistics on its internal procedures and the various peti­
tions on which it acts. Those statistics often provide the raw material for studies by in­
dependent academics. 
80. One explanation suggested for the NLRB's preference for using adjudication 
rather than rulemaking is that adjudication is less likely to expose the Board to the political 
controversy which a rulemaking procedure would engender. Political pressures would be 
great considering the powerful interested constituencies involved. See Note, NLRB 
Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural Fairness, 89 YALE L.J. 982 (1980). How­
ever, both Member Zimmerman in his dissent in St. Francis II and Member Dennis in her 
concurrence called for rulemaking on the issue of bargaining units in the health care indus­
try. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text. 
81. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
82. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
83. In St. Francis III, Judge Edwards noted that the thrust of the Board's decision in 
St. Francis II was based on the erroneous assumption that the disparity of interests test was 
mandated by the 1974 amendments. As a result, the Board "made no attempt to justify its 
disparity-of-interests standard as a reasonable interpretation of section 9 of the Act . . . 
[the Board adopted the disparity of interest test] either without regard to the standards 
enunciated in section 9 or as a supervening standard for employees in the health-care indus­
try." IBEW v. NLRB, No. 85-1642, 25 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 1987). 
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relations certainly agree is that the Board's unit determination deci­
sion has a profound effect on employer-employee relations in a given 
enterprise. As a Brookings Institute study noted over fifteen years 
ago: 
Unit determination plays a large role in both the private and public 
sectors in influencing which, if any, union will be chosen as a bar­
gaining representative, the power structure of bargaining, the ability 
of various groups of employees to affect directly the terms and con­
ditions of their employment, and the peacefulness and effectiveness 
of the bargaining relationship. 84 
The average acute care hospital has a large number of employees 
who potentially are eligible for a "professional" unit under either St. 
Francis I or St. Francis II. Typically, the largest single group is regis­
tered nurses. 8S If a single group of these employees, such as registered 
nurses, is not able to demonstrate a disparity of interests from the 
other professional employees86 under St. Francis II they likely will be 
lumped together in a single election unit. 87 In Keokuk Area Hospital 
84. H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES (1971). See also 
Rose, supra note 3; Another view of Union Organizing, supra note 3. 
85. This note uses registered nurses as an example of a contiguous, recognizable 
group of health care professionals. 
86. Former Chairman Van De Water considered the disparity of interests test to 
entail two appropriate units for health care institutions, all professionals and all non-profes­
sionals. The burden would be on the petitioning employees (e.g. registered nurses) who 
would be granted a more limited unit "but only where it is clearly established that the 
employees in the proposed unit have a notable disparity of interest from employees in the 
larger unit which would prohibit or inhibit fair representation for them if they were denied 
separate representation." St. Francis Hosp. & IBEW, 265 N.L.R.B. 1023, 1040, 112 
L.R.R.M. 1153, 1167 (1984) (Chairman Van De Water dissenting). 
See NLRB v. HMO Int'l, 678 F.2d 806, 812 n.17 (9th Cir. 1982); Presbyterian/St. 
Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. St. Francis 
Hosp. of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Stapp, supra note 48, at 75 (The 
conclusion that the petitioner must bear the burden of demonstrating why the smaller unit 
is appropriate stems from the premise that the employee's community of interest is 
subordinate to the admonition against unit proliferation.). 
87. This note does not attempt to give an exhaustive account of regional directors' 
decisions on appropriate bargaining units after St. Francis II. It is too early to predict what 
factors must be present and in what quantities to constitute a "disparity." However, a 
sampling of initial interpretations of St. Francis II by regional directors sheds some light. 
In January 1986, the Regional Director vacated an April 2, 1980, election held in a unit of 
engineering employees at the Community Hospital of Glen Cove, N.Y. The Director found 
that the hospital's 1,100 employees could be grouped into three units: finance, medical, and 
service and maintenance. Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, NLRB 29-RC-4833 (Jan. 17, 
1986). In Doctors Hosp. of Montclair & Local 1428 of the United Food & Commercial 
Workers, NLRB 31-RC-4837 (Jan. 24, 1985), Regional Director Roger Goubeaux re­
opened the case of a union that had been certified in 1981 to represent medical technicians, 
pharmacists, and registered dieticians. Goubeaux revoked certification and ruled that the 
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and Iowa Nurses Association,88 the Regional Director certified an all 
RN unit in 1980. The employer refused to bargain and on August 27, 
1984, the National Labor Relations Board remanded the case for fur­
ther consideration consistent with St. Francis II. On January 11, 1985, 
the Regional Director revoked certification of the union and directed 
an election in an all professional unit. The National Board unani­
mously approved this unit determination on January 27, 1986.89 In 
the recent case of North Arundel Hospital and Maryland Nurses Asso­
ciation,9o the Regional Director approved the all-RN unit requested by 
the petitioner. He did so even after reconsideration based on the dis­
parity of interests test set forth in St. Francis II. The National Board 
unanimously reversed, finding that "the smallest appropriate unit for 
bargaining must be an overall professional unit."91 On December 29, 
1986, in Middletown Hospital Association and Ohio Nurses Associa­
tion,92 the Board unanimously affirmed an administrative law judge's 
decision, made on the basis of St. Francis II, that an RN only unit at 
Middletown Hospital was not appropriate. The Board expressed ap­
proval that the ALJ's decision was "premised largely on factors other 
than the degree of functional integration between the two groups, such 
as similarity of pay and benefits and centralized labor relations and 
personnel policies. "93 
It is manifestly difficult to organize such an overall professional 
unit. The difficulties stem from the divergent characteristics of the 
sub-groups comprising the overall professional unit. For example, 
many employees do not know each other or even see each other at 
their place of employment. Further, some sub-groups are physically 
isolated from each other, and some employees are involved in direct 
patient care while others never see a patient. It is difficult for a bar­
gaining agent to meld an effective organizing committee from such a 
disparate group. The fact that these employees have widely varied 
professional and employment goals discourages consensus on the 
unit was inappropriate because it did not include registered nurses. Director Robert Fuchs 
found a unit of all RNs at Calais, Maine, Regional Hospital appropriate in May of 1983; 
but on December 7, 1984 he issued a supplemental decision finding that, after St. Francis 
II, only an all professional unit was appropriate. Calais Regional Hosp. & Me. State 
Nurses Ass'n, NLRB I-RC-17,830 (Dec. 7, 1984). 
88. 278 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (Jan. 27, 1986). 
89. Id. 
90. NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 17,804 (Apr. 16, 1986). 
91. Id. 
92. 282 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (Dec. 29, 1986). The Ohio Nurses Association has filed an 
appeal with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. No decision has 
been handed down as of the time of this writing. 
93. Id. 
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changes to be made in their work-life through collective bargaining, 
the ultimate end of the organizing effort. 
Professor Gorman has stated that union organizers prefer 
smaller, more homogeneous units while management usually prefers a 
larger, more heterogeneous unit for election purposes.94 This observa­
tion, albeit correct, may mask a more significant variable in the labor 
relations equation. A recent study conducted by Professor John 
Thomas Delaney, Union Success in Hospital Representation Elec­
tions,95 examines what factors affected the outcome of representation 
elections in hospitals. After considering political, social, and eco­
nomic variables which might affect elections, Professor Delaney found 
that the factor which correlates most strongly with the success or fail­
ure of union organizing efforts is unit size. 
These data suggest that NLRB administrative decisions signifi­
cantly affect the results of representation elections in hospitals. For 
instance, if the Board recognizes small, specialized hospital units, 
unions seem to benefit. Conversely, if the Board favors large or 
broad units, hospitals seem to benefit. In general, the nature of the 
bargaining unit and elections process may be more important deter­
minants of union success in elections than environmental or hospital 
factors. 96 
Thus, when the Board adopts a test which it knows will result in 
larger bargaining units, the Board should realize that, at the same 
time, it is making it more difficult for employees to organize and win 
certification elections. To this extent, the Board may be frustrating 
the goal of fostering collective bargaining in an effort to prevent undue 
proliferation. 
B. 	 Effect of Occupational Heterogeneity on Collective Bargaining 
and Election Outcomes 
Research indicates that "traditional" economic issues (e.g. wages 
and pensions) are not the prime motivating factors behind the or­
ganizing efforts of health care professionals.97 Not surprisingly, the 
94. 	 R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 68; Curley, supra note 44. 
95. 	 Delaney, supra note 14. See also Becker & Miller, supra note 13. 
96. 	 Delaney, supra note 14, at 159 (emphasis added). 
97. A recent report issued by the American Hospital Association indicates that U.S. 
health professionals share these goals. The report says that the list of professional concerns 
and organizing issues shared by professional and white collar health care employees include 
quality of care, quality of work, stress, job restructuring, and adequate staffing. Organizing 
in Health Care Industry Exepected to Increase in. Coming Years, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 15 (Jan. 23, 1987). 
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bargaining goals of RNs also do not center on economic issues.98 
"Professional issues" such as staffing (nurse/patient ratio), availability 
of future professional educational opportunities, in-service instruction, 
and better equipment rank high on the list of negotiating priorities.99 
Although there is little comprehensive research available in the United 
States, Professor Allen M. Ponak conducted a revealing study on the 
collective bargaining goals of Canadian RNs.1OO The study tested two 
hypotheses: that RNs distinguished professional goals from "tradi­
tional" bargaining goals; and that they attached priority to those pro­
fessional goals in negotiations. The results of the study "indicated not 
merely that professional bargaining goals were important but that they 
were more important, than traditional bargaining goals ...."101 
Other studies indicate that when employees with different professional 
goals are required to engage in a common collective bargaining pro­
cess, the professional goals of both groups are submerged in favor of 
economic objectives, which are the only types of issues that allow a 
consensus to emerge. 102 Lacking consensus, the employees also lack 
the bargaining strength to enforce their demands on management. 
Two inferences regarding the future behavior of RNs can be 
made from the above research. First, RNs will be less likely to exer­
cise their right to organize (and risk possible repercussions from man­
agement) if they are included in units with professional employees that 
do not share their employment goals. The RNs will realize at the out­
set of the organizing process that it is unlikely that their professional 
concerns will muster strong support from other medical professionals 
such as laboratory technologists or pharmacists, much less non-medi­
98. A 1981 study of unionism in the health care industry noted that "RNs dominate 
union activity among professional workers," and that: "Their principal interest and fre­
quent source of conflicts with management has been in the nonwage area, particularly staff­
ing levels and assignments." Cain, Becker, McLaughlin & Schwenk, supra note 27, at 309. 
99. See supra note 97. 
100. Ponak, Unionized Professionals and the Scope ofBargaining: A Study ofNurses, 
34 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 396 (1981). 
101. Id. at 406 (emphasis added). See also Bruggink, Finan, Gendel & Todd, Direct 
and Indirect Effects of Unionization on the Wage Levels of Nurses: A Case Study of New 
Jersey Hospitals, 6 J. LAB. RES. 381 (1985). "Even though RN's in teaching hospitals have 
higher work requirements, the coefficient for the teaching hospital dummy is statistically 
insignificant. Apparently, no additional wage rewards are required for the increased work 
effort." Id. at 413. An uncontrolled but nonetheless interesting sampling was taken by RN 
Magazine on the issue of nurses and unionization. On the issue of what bargaining goals 
nurses would like to see unions address, the results of this survey correlate strongly with 
the trend suggested by the studies cited above. See Lee, A Wary New Welcome for Unions, 
RN, Nov. 1982, at 35-40. 
102. Perry & Angle, Bargaining Unit Structure and Organizational Outcomes, 20 
INDUS. REL. 47 (1981); Cain, Becker, McLaughlin & Schwenk, supra note 27. 
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cal professionals. In turn, this will make achievement of these goals at 
the bargaining table less likely. With the end product of the organiz­
ing effort-the right to engage in collective bargaining-seen as an 
inefficient vehicle for the achievement of these professional goals at the 
heart of their employment concerns, RNs will be far less likely to en­
gage in the time consuming and risky business of union organizing. 
Even if professional employees are successful in organizing them­
selves into these heterogeneous bargaining units, the units' very heter­
ogeneity may force a sUbjugation of those professional and 
employment goals of greatest concern to RNs in favor of the "com­
mon ground" issues of wages, pensions, health benefits, and the like. 103 
This is hardly the goal which the Board sets out to achieve in unit 
determinations, viz., a unit which assures employees the fullest free­
dom in exercising the rights guaranteed by the Act. 104 
The Board should reconsider whether the disparity of interests 
test strikes the proper balance. Even if some employees are able to 
organize, the fruits of collective bargaining may be denied them in 
contradiction to the purpose of the 1974 amendments. 
III. Is THE ADOPTION OF THE DISPARITY OF 
INTERESTS TEST NECESSARY? 
Non-proliferation of bargaining units is not an end in itself. It is a 
means of minimizing work stoppages which interrupt provision of 
health care services. In the words of the St. Francis II majority, the 
disruptions said to flow from undue proliferation of bargaining units 
are "work stoppages resulting from initial organizing activities, juris­
dictional disputes, and sympathy strikes."105 This section of the note 
examines each in turn. 
It is far from clear why work stoppages should result from initial 
organizing activities within health care institutions more frequently in 
smaller units than in larger ones. Since the enactment of the 1974 
amendments, recognition strikes in the health care industry, never a 
common occurrence, have been even more rare.106 Health care em­
ployees are, generally, less likely to strike to gain recognition when 
103. See generally Perry & Angle, supra note 100; Cain, Becker, McLaughlin & 
Schwenk, supra note 27. See also Ponak, supra note 100. 
104. 29 U.S.c. § IS9(b) (1982). 
105. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
106. Testifying before the House Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations 
and on Manpower and Housing on October 10, 1984, Executive Vice-President of the Na­
tional Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, Bob Muehlenkamp, stated that in 
the ten years since the enactment of the 1974 amendments, his 100,000+ member union 
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they are presented with a peaceful, legal alternative. 107 
Unlike other private sector employees who may begin organiza­
tional picketing and strike activity at any time, Section 8(g) of the Act, 
added by the 1974 amendments, requires labor organizations to give 
notice to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service ten days 
prior to engaging in picketing, strikes, or other concerted work stop­
pages at health care facilities. lOS Employees whose labor organizations 
do not comply with the notice provisions of Section 8(g) lose the pro­
tection of the Act. 109 Section 8(b )(7)(C) requires that a union which is 
picketing for recognition file for an election "within a reasonable pe­
riod not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of the picket­
ing,"110 and that the Board move expeditiously to determine the 
appropriate unit and direct an election. I I I Given these statutory con­
straints and the paucity of recognitional strike activity since enactment 
has been involved in only four recognition strikes. 56 WHITE COLLAR REP. (BNA) 415 
(Oct. 10, 1984). 
107. Although there have been hospital strikes in some areas of the country, 
they are rare. One of the local organizers for the Service Employees International 
Union indicated to me that the main force working against using the strike 
weapon is the employees themselves. As he put it, "Getting them to join the 
union was difficult, but getting them to strike would be impossible-they identify 
with the patients and their critical place in the hospital organization." 
T. BAROCCI, NON-PROFIT HOSPITALS 151 (1981). See also Cain, Becker, McGaughlin & 
Schwenk, supra note 27, at 193; Lee, supra note 101, at 35-40 (poll shows many RNs 
opposed to striking). 
108. A labor organization before engaging in any strike, picketing, or other 
concerted refusal to work at any health care institution shall, not less than ten 
days prior to such action, notify the institution in writing and the Federal Media­
tion and Conciliation Service of that intention .... The notice shall state the date 
and time that such action will commence. 
29 U.S.c. § 158(g) (1982). 
109. "Any employee who engages in a strike within any notice period specified in 
subsection, or who engages in any strike within the appropriate period specified in subsec­
tion (g) of this section, shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the 
particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of this Act ...." 29 
U.S.c. § 158(d) (1982). 
110. 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1982). But it was the intent of the Senate to shorten 
the period in the case of recognitional picketing at a health care institution. 
In recognition picketing cases under Section 8(b)(7)(C), the National Labor 
Relations Board has ruled that a reasonable period of time is thirty days absent 
unusual circumstances such as violence or intimidation. It is the sense of the 
Committee that picketing of a health care institution would in itself constitute an 
unusual circumstance justifying the application of a period of time less than thirty 
days. 
S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. I, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 3946, 3951. 
111. [W]hen such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without 
regard to the provisions of section 159(c)(I) of this title or the absence ofa show­
ing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an elec­
tion in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results 
thereof .... 
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of the amendments, increasing the size of bargaining units probably 
will not reduce the already minimal number of such disruptions. On 
the contrary, labor leaders warn that the frustration caused by Board 
policy on unit determinations in the health care industry may lead to 
such disruptions by encouraging employees to bypass Board 
procedures. 112 
On the issue of jurisdictional disputes, congressional concern is 
well-meaning, but it appears misplaced. Health care institutions em­
ploy a broad spectrum of professionals, technicians, and tradespeople, 
and generally have a ramified structure of job classifications and re­
sponsibilities. This structure contains the potential for disputes over 
allocation of duties between bargaining units. Congress, mindful of 
the difficulties which proliferation of bargaining units has caused in 
the construction industry, accordingly sought to eliminate this poten­
tial source of disruption from the health care industry}13 
However, state laws license medical professionals and para-pro­
fessionals in the health care field. Health care professionals legally 
cannot delegate most of their duties and responsibilities. 114 Nor is it 
likely that hospitals would agree to delegation given the increased risk 
of error and liability. Engaging in a work stoppage to force an em­
ployer to transfer work from one bargaining unit to another would 
violate Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act}15 Moreover, the Board has the 
29 u.s.c. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1982). 
Failure to file a petition within the "reasonable time" specified in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(b)(7)(C) leaves the union open to an unfair labor practice charge. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) 
(1982) directs the Board to move quickly on such violations: "[T]he preliminary investiga­
tion of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases ...." 
29 U.S.C. § 160(1). The restraining order shall issue if the court finds "substantial and 
irreparable injury to the charging party will be unavoidable." Id. 
112. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
113. See supra note 33. 
114. The Board is aware of this feature of the health care industry. Recently, in the 
course of reviewing a unit determination, the Board noted: 
Moreover, although the Regional Director found little evidence of interchange of 
duties or functions between registered nurses and other professionals, it is clear 
that this lack of interchange is inherent to (sic) the health care industry because 
all of the professional employees-including registered nurses-have received 
specialized education and training in their own fields so as to make job in­
terchange impossible, or even illegal, where state certification or licensure is 
required. 
North Arundel Hosp. & Md. Nurses Ass'n, NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1117,804 (April 16, 1986). 
115. It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents 
... to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any 
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a 
strike ... where ... an object thereof is: (D) forcing or requiring any employer 
to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a 
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power to expedite settlement of jurisdictional disputes under Section 
lO(k),116 and Section 10(1) of the Act. 117 Lastly, the potential threat of 
work stoppages caused by jurisdictional disputes simply has not mate­
rialized. 118 The adoption of a new test which yields larger and fewer 
bargaining units is not needed to ameliorate a problem that does not 
exist. 
The issue of sympathy strikes similarly has not emerged as a ma­
jor problem within the health care industry since the enactment of the 
1974 amendments. Here again, analogies to the problem of sympathy 
strikes in the construction industry, attributed to proliferation of bar­
gaining units, break down. Health care employees do not have the 
same degree of union consciousness or solidarity that has developed as 
a result of decades of tradition in the construction industry. Rather, 
they continue to view their primary mission as service to the patient 
and the communityl19 and tend not to honor the picket lines of strik­
ing co-workers.120 
The notice provisions of the LMRA also apply to non-striking 
employees who concertedly refuse to cross the picket lines of other 
employees. 121 The few instances of sympathy strikes which have oc­
curred typically have been cases of professional employees (RNs) re­
fusing to cross the picket lines of striking non-professional employees 
(service and maintenance personnel) or vice-versa. By its own terms, 
particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organi­
zation or in another trade, craft, or class . . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(0) (1982). 
116. "Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice 
within the meaning of paragraph (4)(0) of section 158(b) of this title, the Board is empow­
ered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice 
shall have arisen .... " 29 U.S.c. § 160(k) (1982). 
117. The Board may obtain a temporary restraining order against work stoppages 
caused by jurisdictional disputes. "In situations where such relief is appropriate the proce­
dure specified herein shall apply to charges with respect to section 158(b)(4)(0) of this 
title." 29 U.S.c. § 160(1) (1982). See supra note 111 for circumstances under which a 
restraining order will be granted. 
118. Robert Muehlenkamp, Executive Vice-President of the National Union of Hos­
pital and Health Care Employees Union testified before the House Subcommittee on La­
bor-Management Relations on Manpower and Housing that his union has engaged in 160 
strikes since the enactment of the 1974 amendments but that none were a result ofjurisdic­
tional disputes. 56 WHITE COLLAR REP. (BNA) 414-15 (Oct. 10, 1984). Statistics are not 
available to determine what number of § 160(k) hearings take place specifically in the 
health care industry. 
119. See supra note 107. 
120. "It is highly relevant to note that the occupational groups in hospitals have 
often crossed the picket lines of one another." Cain, Becker, McGaughlin & Schwenk, 
supra note 27, at 197. 
121. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text. 
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the disparity of interests test would not address this problem. 122 
Recognitional, jurisdictional, and sympathy work stoppages were 
not major problems for the health care industry during the ten years 
the Board adhered to its St. Francis I view of the congressional admo­
nition against proliferation of bargaining units. Ample means exist 
within the Act to deal effectively with whatever sporadic outbreaks of 
such activity that occur. Despite the premises articulated by the St. 
Francis II majority, the adoption of the disparity of interest test was 
not dictated by necessity. 
CONCLUSION 
Congressional concern over labor relations in the health care in­
dustry is valid. This industry must be, and has been, treated differ­
ently than other industries in the private sector. Employees must be 
constrained in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 
of the NLRA because of the impact on helpless patients and the pub­
lic. They must, however, be able to exercise those rights within the 
framework of labor legislation. Forcing health care employees to re­
sort to economic coercion in order to gain recognition and the free 
exercise of collective bargaining would be disastrous. 
The St. Francis II majority based adoption of the disparity of in­
terests test on its interpretation of the legislative history of the 1974 
amendments. In so doing, the majority turned its back on the inter­
pretation the Board has held since the enactment of the amend­
ments. 123 They did not address the empirical results of the Board's 
original interpretation at any point. They did not address the poten­
122. See Remarks by Robert Muehlenkamp, Executive Vice-President of the Na­
tional Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees testifying before the House Subcom­
mittee on Labor-Management Relations on Manpower and Housing, 56 WHITE COLLAR 
REP. (BNA) 415 (Oct. 10, 1984). 
123. John Fanning, former Board Chairman commented on the Board's reversal of 
precedent: "How can we both be following Congressional mandate? ... To have every 
decision reversed-we couldn't have been that wrong." 56 WHITE COLLAR REP. (BNA) 
253 (Aug. 22, 1984). 
However, this is precisely what one commentator, Attorney Debra Dyleski-Najjar, 
contends. 
From 1974 until 1984, however, the Board applied traditional community­
of-interests standards and, contrary to the intent of Congress, certified virtually 
every petitioned-for group of health care workers as a separate appropriate unit. 
This failure to heed the congressional admonition contributed to an increase in 
the number of strikes in the health care industry following the enactment of the 
1974 amendments. Thus, it is apparent that the community-of-interests test not 
only violated congressional intent, but also resulted in the very end which the 
nonproliferation mandate was designed to avoid .... 
[T]he Board's prior unit determination findings and the fragmentation of in­
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tial effects of the new disparity of interests test at any point. What 
remains is a combat of conflicting interpretations of congressional ac­
tion; what emerges is a new test which gives little guidance to the 
bench and bar.'24 
Member Zimmerman stated in his dissent in St. Francis II that 
the issue of unit determinations in the health care industry is ripe for 
rulemaking. 125 Member Dennis expressed similar views in her concur­
ring opinion. 126 The majority declined to exercise the Board's 
rulemaking authority. 127 
However, the issue of unit determinations in the health care in­
dustry presents itself as a strong candidate for breaking with the 
terests ... [have] led to strikes in health care institutions over the past twelve 
years. 
Dyleski-Najjar, supra note 48, at 421 (footnotes omitted). In support of her argument, 
Attorney Dyleski-Najjar cites statistics on the number of strikes in health care institutions 
between 1974 and 1980, which show a marked increase in both the number of work stop­
pages and the number of idle days per year. Id. at 402 n.lO!. 
However, Attorney Dyleski-Najjar's chain of logic, that the increased strike activity 
was a result of the Board's failure to heed the congressional admonition against unit 
proliferation, is highly suspect. An alternative and far more likely explanation is simply 
that unionized employees who have the legal right to strike are far more likely to do so than 
unorganized employees who do not have that right. In 1974, the baseline year for the study 
cited, health care employees across the nation came under the aegis of the National Labor 
Relations Act. See supra note 15. Throughout the period in question (1974-1980) tens of 
thousands of health care employees joined the ranks of organized labor. Union organizing 
activity, union election victories, and, not surprisingly, legal, union-led strikes increased 
during that period. It is, of course, legitimate to speculate on what effect the Board's poli­
cies may have had on strike activity during that period, but Attorney Dyleski-Najjar's in­
ference of a direct correlation overstates the case. 
Furthermore, as the St. Francis II majority stated: "Congress concluded that the ob­
ject of minimizing work stoppages resulting from initial organizational activities, jurisdic­
tional disputes, and sympathy strikes could best be achieved, and thus the likelihood of 
disruptions to health care reduced, by minimizing the number of units appropriate in the 
health care industry." St. Francis Hosp. & IBEW, 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 950-51, 116 
L.R.R.M. 1465, 1468 (1984). Congress did not intend that the nonproliferation mandate 
reach and restrict the ability of health care employees to engage in economic strikes; but 
rather provided other means to so restrict such activity. 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1982); see also 
supra text accompanying note 7!. Unfortunately, the statistics cited by Attorney Dyleski­
Najjar do not separate days lost due to economic strikes versus stoppages resulting from 
recognition strikes, jurisdictional disputes, and sympathy strikes. Those statistics alone 
would yield meaningful and reliable correlations between the Board's unit determination 
decisions and the type of disruptions they are designed to curtail. 
124. "By today's decision, however, the majority had demonstrated the futility of 
this Board's attempts to resolve this issue through traditional case-by-case adjudication. 
Rulemaking could provide an acceptable and feasible means to end the lO-year contro­
versy." St. Francis 11,271 N.L.R.B. at 958, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1475 (Member Zimmerman, 
dissenting). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 955, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1472 (Member Dennis, concurring). 
127. Id. at 953 n.39, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471 n.39. 
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Board's "tradition" of avoiding rulemaking. The health care industry 
is expanding; more of these issues will arise. During the past twelve 
years, adjudication produced a tremendous number of cases concern­
ing unit determinations and the disparity of interest test will only con­
tinue this trend. 128 Litigation always means delay. In the sphere of 
labor relations, delay often translates into the destruction of union ma­
jorities, the de facto denial of bargaining rights, and ultimately, the 
demise of confidence in the efficacy and impartiality of the National 
Labor Relations Boar<;l.129 
Rulemaking would require a thorough discussion of the empirical 
data and societal consequences of unit determination decisions. It 
would allow full participation by the labor movement in the process. 
The rulemaking procedure would encourage interested parties (princi­
pally unions and employer associations) to fund industrial relations 
research which would better equip the Board to design a workable 
system which would safeguard the public interest while ensuring em­
ployees of non-profit health care institutions the right to organize and 
engage in collective bargaining-the goals of the 1974 amendments. 
Litigation over unit determinations should decrease, because the 
guidelines for those decisions would have been reached by some rough 
consensus between management and labor; or at least after full partici­
128. "Although both union and management representatives hoped St. Francis [II] 
would mean an end to the decade of debate, experts on both sides agree that litigation on 
the bargaining unit issue will continue for years." 56 WHITE COLLAR REP. (BNA) 250 
(Oct. 22, 1984). 
129. Veteran union organizer Eileen McManus related this experience: 
I filed a petition for a unit of Registered Nurses in Maryland in 1979, about a 
week before St. Francis 0/ Lynwood issued out of the [Ninth] circuit. We made 
what was in retrospect an unfortunate decision to maintain our petition for Regis­
tered Nurses, which of course the Employer contested. The election was held in a 
timely fashion, and we won with better than a two-to-one margin. The employer 
refused to negotiate, we filed charges, the Board granted summary judgment, and 
the case went to the Fourth Circuit Court. The Court remanded the case to the 
Board with instructions to rewrite its decision with more attention to the unit 
proliferation issue. The case went back to the Board and stayed there until St. 
Francis II issued. It was then remanded to the Region, and we were notified 
about two months ago that a new election in an all professional unit had been 
ordered.... Given that we still would have won the first election by more than a 
comfortable margin if all of the people the employer wanted in had voted and had 
voted no, it's been an interesting exercise. In the six years that intervened be­
tween our mandate and the decision to order the second election, nearly all of our 
organizing committee had been pressured to leave. The unit size, according to 
the Employer, has doubled. This is not an isolated case, nor is it even our worst 
case. 
Address by Eileen McManus, entitled A Union Perspective on Health Care Bargaining 
Units, Association of Labor Relations Agencies Conference (July 25, 1985). 
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pation by both in the process. Courts of appeals should be expected to 
afford deference to future Board unit determinations because the 
Board will have brought its expertise in labor relations, not statutory 
interpretation, to the issues. 
Other commentators have advanced alternatives short of 
rulemaking. Attorney Michael Stapp has suggested that the Board 
adopt a "rulemaking approach" to the adjudication of unit determina­
tions in health care institutions. 13o This approach would balance the 
likelihood that patient care disruptions will result from granting a sep­
arate bargaining unit to the petitioning employees against the degree 
to which employees' organizational rights would be furthered by 
granting the requested unit. l3l Stapp argues that only by weighing 
the actual threat of patient care disruption against the community of 
interest of the petitioning employees and the free exercise of their right 
to engage in collective bargaining can the reasoning behind the con­
gressional admonition against unit proliferation be implemented and 
the "twin goals" of the amendments be realized. 132 
Professor of Labor Relations James Gross would have Congress 
repeal the language of the Labor-Management Relations Act which 
forbids expenditures by the Board for employment of economists and 
sociologists. 133 He views this deficiency as an underlying cause of the 
Board's vacillation on many important labor relations issues as well as 
the reason for the lack of judicial deference to Board expertise. Em­
pirical investigation of past as well as potential future effects of Board 
policy would give the Board its own source of information by which to 
judge the adversaries' arguments in each particular adjudication. An 
examination of the results of the Board's decisions by the use of empir­
ical data and professional research may aid in gaining enforcement of 
130. Stapp, supra note 48, at 71 n.65. 
131. This would be a case-by-case empirical approach which would determine the 
propensity for patient care disruptions in a particular institution. 
Factors to be considered in determining the likelihood of patient care disruptions 
would include the total number of authorization cards signed in the proposed 
unit; the different facilities in the proposed unit; the likelihood that a strike by one 
particular bargaining unit would be debilitating to the hospital; the likelihood 
that other employees would cross picket lines should a strike occur in the pro­
posed unit; the authorization card support of the various job classifications within 
the bargaining unit; and the past history of labor unrest in the facility (e.g., wild­
cat strikes). 
Id. 
132. Id. 
133. RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra note 79, at 
264-66. 
331 1987] ST. FRANCIS II 
its orders in courts of appeals, as well as bolster management and la­
bor confidence in the competence and impartiality of the Board. 
The ideas advanced here, and in other commentaries, should lead 
us to question whether the disparity of interests test is adequate to the 
task of achieving the balance between the public need and employees' 
rights sought by Congress when it passed the 1974 health care amend­
ments to the Labor-Management Relations Act. But we must strike 
the proper balance. We cannot allow employees in this vital sector of 
our economy to lose faith in our system of labor legislation.l 34 
William F. Donahue 
134. On May 4, 1987, the Board heard oral argument in the matter of St. Vincent 
Hosp. & Health Center & Mont. Nurses' Ass'n, NLRB Case No. 19-RC-11496. That case 
is an appeal from a Regional Director's decision, based on St. Francis II, that disallowed a 
unit limited to registered nurses requested by the union in favor of an all-professional unit. 
The union's appeal is based on St. Francis III. In addition to adjudication, the Board's 
alternatives include rulemaking and seeking review by the Supreme Court. At the time of 
this writing, the Board has not taken any action. 
